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Abstract: A new politics, linked to the influencer/leader and to the empowerment of the public 
on social networking sites, is currently marking the media agenda. In light of this, the aim of 
this study is to gain further insights into the polarization and influence of political messages on 
Twitter and levels of user participation, in a context marked by social movements and the 
counter-power of citizenship. Based on a triangulated methodology of quantitative and 
qualitative-discursive content analysis, all the tweets were quantified (3,562), selecting only 
those pertaining to the elections (526) posted by the pro-independence and constitutionalist 
candidates of the parties obtaining the highest number of votes, plus 144,382 user engagement 
metrics and 68 front pages of the mainstream Spanish and Catalan press. The results point to a 
unidirectional use of Twitter by political leaders, a higher user response rate, and the influence 
of the digital political agenda on its media counterpart. 
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Introduction 
 
The ways of conveying political messages on the web urgently need to be reviewed. The tweets 
posted on Twitter are currently characterized by their polarized and unidirectional nature not 
only thanks to political influencers/leaders and their parties (Fernández-Gómez, Hernández-
Santaolalla, & Sanz-Marcos, 2018; Labrecque, Markos, & Milne, 2011) but also with the 
collusion of new digital audiences: fan and anti-fan communities alike (Castells, 2009; 
Sampedro, 2014). Given this situation, the mass media has designed a parallel agenda involving 
the publishing of tweets, previously posted by political candidates on their personal accounts 
and then disseminated by their followers with “likes,” retweets, and/or comments. This alliance 
decides what is newsworthy on the Internet. 
 In this digital platform context, the type of communication that is established between users 
has shaped a singular hybrid public sphere (Benkler, 2015; Chadwick, 2013; Jenkins, 2008), in 
which hegemonic and counter-hegemonic groups vie for visibility in order to make themselves 
heard by employing the different mediatization processes (Hjarvard, 2013; Holton et al., 2014) 
available to them (Scolari, 2008).  
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The independence process in Catalonia is the most recent political conflict in Spain and a 
determining factor in its future organization as a state. On October 1, 2017, a referendum was 
called with the aim of asking the region’s citizens whether they were in favor of Catalonia’s 
independence and “disconnection” from Spain (Carrasco-Polaino, Villar-Cirujano, and 
Tejedor-Fuentes, 2018). Despite the combined efforts of courts and law enforcement agencies 
to halt the poll, nearly 2.3 million people (43 percent of the electoral roll) turned up to cast their 
votes on 1 October [16]. The voting, nevertheless, came with unusual scenes of violence. 
Digital platforms satisfy a major communication need in any form of activism — spreading 
open information to mass-scale audiences. Yet, they also fall short of guaranteeing private, 
secured communications between activists when coordinating their actions in hostile 
environments (Poblet, 2017). 
 According to a report released by the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO) in 2017, 40.2 
percent of the respondents believed that Catalonia should be an independent state, 27.4 percent 
an autonomous community, 21.8 percent a federal state, and 4.6 percent a region (CEO, 2017). 
When compared with the poll performed the year before (CEO, 2016), it can be observed that 
the number of those favoring independence and even other territorial models over the 
established constitutional model had increased. Besides the political parties, civic associations 
such as the Asamblea Nacional de Catalunya (ANC), advocating for an independent Catalan 
state, and Sociedad Civil Catalana (SCC), defending quite the opposite, also intervened in the 
debate in Catalonia. On social networking sites, they served as nodal actors and communication 
channels between those in favor or against a new Catalan state (Cramery, 2015; Balcells and 
Padró-Solanet, 2016). This situation of uncertainty came to a head with the application of 
Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, the dissolution of the Catalan parliament, and the 
calling of elections on December 21st. The independence process reached a higher level of 
visibility in a context of mediatization and digitization than ever seen before. 
 Against this background, the counter-agenda promoted on social networking sites 
(Aruguete, 2017; Meraz, 2011; Sung-Tae and Young-Hwan, 2007; Wallsten, 2007) activated a 
bottom-up mechanism implicating the citizenry and civil society, with the ability to condition 
the media agenda (Perales-García and Pont-Sorribes, 2018) thanks to the impact and reach of 
its message on social media. A study on the geographical distribution of media representations 
in the European referendums analyzes more than 70k mentions about the Referendum of 
Catalonia (2017) and shows that transnational corporations from a few Western countries 
dominate the technologically-mediated division of space (Toth, 2018). 
In turn, Twitter has become a political tool for disseminating information (Jackson and Lilleker, 
2011), mobilizing the electorate (Gainous and Wagner, 2014), interacting with the public 
(Stromer-Galley, 2014) and individualizing and personalizing the campaigning style of 
political candidates (Vergeer, Hermans and Sams, 2013). 
 In light of the foregoing, the main objective of this study is to analyze the ways in which 
the political agenda affects its media counterpart on Twitter; a process that conditions the news 
appearing on the front pages of the press and leads to a transfer of agendas between the 
conventional media and their social counterparts. The intention here is to determine politicians’  
Twitter usage: the issues that they broach and how they influence users and the conventional 
media. 
 Employing this approach, an analysis was performed on the Catalan elections held on 21 
December 2017 (21 D), in the context of the independence process (procés in Catalan) 
(Balcells; Padró-Solanet, 2019), focusing on the thematic similarities between the digital and 
conventional media agendas, promoted by influencers/leaders in collaboration with a civic 
activism fostered by the internet (Corominas, 2017). 
 The first hypothesis (H1) is that there was a cause and effect relationship between the 
tweets posted by the political candidates on their personal accounts, the most viral tweets and 
Pérez Curiel, C.                                                                                                        00 
 
the topics covered on the front pages of the press. In parallel and from a content approach, 
‘independence’ was one of the main frames of the polarized messages of the candidates and 
their parties, the community response, and the media agenda (H2). In this vein, those pro-
independence parties with influencers/leaders (Montoya and Vandehey, 2009; Pérez-Ortega, 
2014; Rampersad, 2009) – whose virtue lies in knowing how to combine their tasks as 
influencers with the attention to and management of their political identity in such a propitious 
space as social media (Labrecque, Marko and Milne, 2011; Marshall and Redmond, 2016) – 
have put Twitter to strategic use, placing the spotlight on the Catalan independence/state 
conflict and marking it the agenda of their own followers, the constitutionalist parties and the 
press. 
 By using a triangulated methodology of analysis of quantitative content and comparative 
qualitative-discursive content, a sample of the personal Twitter accounts of the leaders of the 
parties obtaining the greatest number of votes (Inés Arrimadas of Ciudadanos [Cs], Carles 
Puigdemont of JuntsXCat, Marta Rovira of ERC/CatSí, Mikel Iceta of the Socialist Party of 
Catalonia [PSC], Xavier Domènech of Catalunya en Comú-Podem and Xavier García Albiol 
of the People’s Party [PP]) was created, including user engagement metrics (‘likes’, retweets 
and comments) and the front-page news of some of Spain’s and Catalonia’s mainstream 
newspapers (ABC, El País, La Vanguardia and El Periódico de Cataluña) in the context of the 
21 D Catalan elections. 
 Previous studies of the potential of Twitter in electoral processes (Noguera, 2013; 
Rodríguez and Ureña, 2012; Zamora-Medina, Sánchez-Cobarro and Martínez, 2017; Zugasti-
Azagra and Pérez-González, 2015) concur that it is the most popular micro-blogging network 
among politicians and journalists, relegating Facebook and even their own websites to second 
place (Abejón et al., 2017), with statistics demonstrating the relationship between engagement 
and electoral success (Ballesteros et al., 2017), albeit with a unidirectional use (Graham et al. 
2013) and many underused tools (Ballesteros et al., 2017; Cheng, 2017; Congosto-Martínez, 
2014; Dader, 2017). There are thus more reasons in favor than against choosing Twitter as a 
platform, in line with the sample’s subject (who) and object (what). The options offered by 
Twitter versus other platforms for analyzing the online strategies of political influencers and 
user engagement metrics – summarizing direct messages with a maximum of 140 characters, 
stressing with hashtags and going viral as trending topics all influence and determine the 
political and media agendas – make it an especially appropriate object of study. 
 
 
Leadership, influence and political strategies on Twitter  
 
The visibility, speed, and immediate response capacity offered by social media are factors that 
multiply the impact of political influence. With Twitter, a channel that amplifies political 
communication above all at election time (Campos-Domínguez, 2017), it is possible to organize 
campaigns with a very broad potential reach relatively cheaply and swiftly (Karaduman, 2013; 
Thelwall and Cugelman, 2017). Furthermore, citizens participating in the political debate can 
be segmented or grouped according to their ideological leanings (Congosto, Fernández and 
Moro, 2011), thus offering the opportunity to engage and influence different audiences 
(Augure, 2015). But all these yields very different results depending on the candidate and the 
use to which digital tools are put. Nonetheless, previous research has revealed the functionality 
of Twitter in political communication strategies. 
 In this context, opinion leaders – nowadays influencers – not only convey the messages of 
brands, but also those of the mass media and even political parties (Fernández-Gómez, 
Hernández-Santaolalla and Sanz-Marcos, 2018). Moreover, there are resources (hashtags, 
images, links, videos, memes, etc.) for reinforcing each tweet and fostering audience 
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interaction. However, that the messages conveyed by opinion leaders are mainly unidirectional, 
paying little attention to or ignoring the ‘likes’ and comments of users, is remarkable (Mancera-
Rueda and Helfrich, 2014).  
 Thus, in order to explain where the power of their influence lies it is necessary to examine 
the personality traits and attitudes of political candidates (Rahat and Sheafer, 2007; Sánchez-
Murillo, 2005), as well as the propaganda and disinformation mechanisms of the fake discourse 
(Bennett and Livingston, 2018; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Llorente, 2017) that explain 
where the power of their influence resides. 
 A snapshot of Catalonia before the 21 D elections reveals an initial scenario marked by 
conflict and confrontation with the central government, social unrest, the summoning of a 
divided society to the ballot box (i.e. the referendum held on 1 October 2017), and the 
application of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, thus suspending Catalan autonomy. 
Collateral effects such as the imprisonment of pro-independence politicians holding public 
office and the flight from Spain of Carles Puigdemont, the then president of the Catalan regional 
government and the leader of the party Junts per Catalunya, marked the height of the conflict. 
Previous research (Pérez-Curiel and García-Gordillo, 2018; Carrasco-Polaino, Villar-Cirujano 
and Tejedor-Fuentes, 2018) has confirmed, on the one hand, that despite the fact that the 
institutions have the traditional propaganda machine at their full disposal, social networking 
sites in general, and Twitter in particular, are better managed by civic associations, and on the 
other hand that the pro-independence propaganda is much more active and effective in getting 
the message across than its constitutionalist counterpart. 
 The mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni, 2004) and the interest shown by political parties 
in highlighting the personality of their leaders over their ideology (Farrell, 1996) has become 
the driving forces behind the personality-building process facilitated by Twitter (Rodríguez-
Virgili, Jandura and Rebolledo de la Calle, 2014). 
 Separatism is thus framed in the electoral process and the influence of the citizenry resides 
in directly conveying messages to audiences and the media in favor or against the Catalan or 
Spanish political and legal institutions. This discourse has found its maximum expression in 
Puigdemont who uses Twitter tools (hashtags, mentions, links, audio-visual resources, etc.) 
strategically, posts messages with supplementary information and effectively engages users. 
He has thus managed to attract a greater number of followers who by sharing his tweets have 
converted his messages into front-page news in Spanish and Catalan newspapers. 
 This digital political communication and marketing strategy focusing on the individuality 
of the influencer/subject (Puigdemont) and the potential of the object (independence) and 
discourse propaganda, which allowed Puigdemont to eclipse the rest of the candidates – 
including Inés Arrimadas of Cs, the most voted candidate in the 21 D Catalan elections – on 
Twitter and on the front pages of the press. 
 Influencers can be defined as people who have the power to influence others through social 
or conventional media because of their knowledge, experience, credibility, and commitment. 
Citizens have ceased to be mere receivers of information to become prosumers, meaning that 
in addition to participating as spectators, they now also produce their own content (Rego-Rey 
and Romero-Rodríguez, 2016). The aim of these new online influencers is to attract as much 
attention as possible (Marshall and Redmond, 2016). In parallel, we are currently witnessing 
an irreversible process in which the traditional mass media are apparently being substituted by 
networks of individual influencers (Gillin, 2009) who are consolidating their position as 
political opinion leaders. In this long-distance race, the omnipresence of the influencer/leader, 
the ideological polarization, and the imposition of digital content on the agenda are all aspects 
of an information model that the media have been keen to reproduce. 
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The hybridization process of the media and the transfer and polarization of agendas 
 
Some politicians still see social media as information sources more than anything else, but on 
such sites, it is important to listen, respond and update the latest news (Giansante, 2015). Social 
networking sites contribute to political processes and democracy, as far as they give voice to 
citizens and allow them to promote their own actions (Enguix, 2017), thus creating connected 
multitudes (Rovira, 2017). Nowadays, it is online users, converted into gatekeepers, who create 
bubbles of opinion in their own communities, with mutual preferences regarding political 
models. Accordingly, this has triggered a crisis in the field of journalism, which still has not 
known how to react to this new trend in which millions of news stories are shared and 
reproduced on the internet. As a result, these news stories tend to be more striking and 
superficial (Thompson, 2017). The internet and social media only corroborate the theoretical 
principles of first- and second-level agenda setting (Anduiza and Bosch, 2004; McCombs, 
2005; McCombs and Shaw, 1972), in which the media not only decide on the newsworthiness 
of topics, but also assess the substantive (the ideology of political candidates, the stances that 
they take on certain issues and their credentials and experience or personality) and affective 
(the positive or negative public opinion on the topics broached by those candidates and their 
discourses) dimensions.  
 The Pew Research Center report (2010), which compares blog, YouTube and Twitter 
content with that offered by the media, concludes that the most important stories and issues on 
social networking sites differ substantially from those to which the conventional media give 
pride of place. Other studies have confirmed the alignment of political blogs with political 
stories in the press (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Reese, 2007; Scott, 2005), for instance, on 
Twitter, which substantiates the continued relevance of agenda setting for digital media outlets. 
On the other hand, those studies disputing this position (Roberts, Wanta and Dzwo, 2002) 
contend that digital media has contributed to set alternative and independent agendas. In this 
vein, Krane (2010) performed an analysis of the content posted on Twitter by three media 
outlets – The New York Times, CNN and NPR – which reinforces the assumption that there is a 
direct relationship between the digital content disseminated by the media and the subjects that 
are most often broached by users.  
 Accordingly, the aim of this study is to analyze the similarities between the tweets posted 
by politicians on Twitter and user engagement metrics, on the one hand, and the content 
disseminated by the conventional media, on the other, in the context of the 21 D Catalan 
elections. We believe that we can make a contribution to the state of the research in the field 
by examining the causality between the messages of the most influential political candidates 
vis-à-vis the Catalan independence process, the tweets most ‘liked,’ retweeted or commented 
on by the public and the issues making it to the front pages of the press. 
 The argument of the power of the conventional media to set the agenda, given the 
confidence and credibility that they enjoy among the citizenry, has succumbed to new processes 
emerging in the field of social media. This has reinforced the intermediate theory of agenda 
setting (Atwater and Fico, 1986), which examines the relationship between the media agenda 
and that set by emerging interest groups and/or social movements (Castells, 2012) in an attempt 
to transform ‘political, social and economic’ realities (Bermúdez and Gallego, 2011). In line 
with our research, their conclusions have highlighted three key aspects: the central role of 
institutions and/or organizations in setting the agenda; how the agenda is performed; and the 
participatory process (Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2008). In the social media context, the 
counter-agenda conditions sources and topics in the conventional media, notwithstanding the 
theory’s critics who hold that social media set an independent and alternative agenda (Roberts, 
Wanta  and Dzwo,  2002) or who suggest focusing more on the interaction processes between 
the micro and meso levels established by political organizations (Bekkers et al., 2011). In short, 
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in the field of political communication, the conventional and social media agendas correspond 
to issues of interest to the centers of power, a trend that is ostensibly more visible at election 
time. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The independence process in Catalonia has achieved an unprecedented political and social 
relevance in Spain. Therefore, from a methodological perspective it is essential to identify the 
sources (political candidates and parties, plus the government), the facts (topics) and online 
(social networking sites/Twitter), and offline (the media/press) communication channels as the 
main variables of this study. 
 In view of this, the research method employed here involved analyzing the influence of the 
topics broached by the candidates on the media agenda. To this end, a quantitative and 
qualitative-discursive content analysis was performed (Van Dijk, 2015; Callejo, 2010; Flick, 
2004; Krippendorff, 2004; Wimmer and Dominik, 1996), following a comparative approach 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004) and using triangulation: politicians/users/the media. 
 The study sample focused on the campaigning before the 21 D Catalan elections, with a 
time frame encompassing the campaign period (5-19 December), the elections per se (21 
December) and the day after (22 December). The day before the elections (20 December) when 
no active campaigning was allowed was not taken into account for obvious reasons. 
 From among the total number of tweets (3,562) posted by the political parties and their 
candidates, 526 relating to the elections were selected. Following this, the user engagement 
metrics (144,382) and the most popular tweets (44) posted by the candidates (Inés Arrimadas 
of Cs, Carles Puigdemont of JuntsXCat, Marta Rovira of ERC/CatSí, Mikel Iceta of the PSC, 
Xavier Domènech of Catalunya en Comú-Podem and Xavier García Albiol of the PP) making 
it to the front pages of the press (ABC, El País, La Vanguardia and El Periódico de Cataluña) 
were analyzed. These political parties and their candidates were selected on the basis of the 
following criteria: 
 
• They were the most voted parties in the 2017 Catalan elections, obtaining over 90 per 
cent of the ballots cast. 
• They define themselves as pro-independence or constitutionalist parties. 
• The politicians chosen headed the list of the candidates of their respective parties. 
 
This approach allowed for comparing the Twitter use and strategies of the different candidates 
and the influence of their messages on users and on the front page news in the press, selected 
in terms of the following criteria: 
 
• These are reference newspapers at national and regional levels. 
• They respond to a conservative position of right-wing (ABC), moderate Catalanist (La 
Vanguardia) and socialist liberal (El País and El Periódico de Cataluña). 
• On their front pages they have dealt with the subject of the Catalan “Procés.” 
 
Twitonomy was used for data sampling, while IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 24, was employed 
for data processing. The margin of error was calculated with Scott’s pi, reaching a confidence 
level of 0.98. 
 A typology of variables, with exclusive categories for each one, was created for the 
analytical procedure (Graham et al., 2013): 
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  Table 1. Analysis protocol and typology of variables 
 
Variables Twitter Press 
Quantitative Variables -No. of tweets  
-Frequency 
-User engagement metrics 
(‘likes’, retweets and comments) 
- No. of front pages 
- Percentage of space 
- Frequency 
  
Qualitative Variables - Topic of tweet  
-Resources (hashtags, links, 
mentions, images and videos) 
- Relationship with the election 
theme 
 
- Topic of front page 
- Presence or absence of the 
politician (images or copy) 
- Relationship with current affairs 
(elections) 
 
Discursive Variables -Language and propaganda 
variables 
(candidate tweets) 
 
 
-Equivalence on the frontpages 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Data coding was performed using the different types of variables figuring among the options 
offered by the software package (IBM SPSS Statistics 24). The numerical variables, whose sole 
aim was quantification, such as the number of related tweets (politicians/users) and the sub 
variables, i.e. the user engagement metrics (‘likes’, retweets and comments), were classified as 
scale variables. The categorical variables, with only two possible answers (yes or no) and the 
objective to quantify the percentage of affirmative and negative cases were coded as 
dichotomous nominal variables (yes = 1, no = 2). This type of variable belonged to that of ‘the 
relationship or not with current affairs’ and that of ‘the presence/absence of the candidate on 
the front pages of the press’ (one variable for each newspaper). The categorical variables that 
could only have one answer from among more than two possible ones were also coded as 
nominal variables, assigning a numerical value to each possible answer (1 = a, 2 = b, 3 = c). 
These corresponded to the ‘theme’ variable. The variables related to resources of the language 
of propaganda (Nocetti, 1990; Thompson, 2017) are: use of labels (1), use of fallacies (2), 
stereotypes (3), biased attributions (4), speaking from other sources (5), selection of 
information (6), opinions as facts (7), Others (8). 
 
 
Results analysis and discussion 
 
The traditional press tends to give front-page coverage to those messages posted by political 
candidates on Twitter that swell the numbers of their followers (whether as a result of 
acceptance, neutrality or rejection) and reproduce an information model that, if it works on the 
internet, should also do so for them. The research results have substantiated this initial premise. 
 An equation in which two related factors and contexts intervene was employed: X 
(politician/influencer on Twitter) and Y (offline press), both with the ability to influence a third 
supplementary factor (user/reader). 
 In view of the results, the design of the media agenda is determined by the relevance of a 
subject who, through the strategic use of online tools, manages to elicit an active and viral 
reaction from a number of followers, inversely proportional to the number of readers engaged 
by the press. 
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The methodological structure explains the cause and effect relationship, using triangulation to 
classify the results: quantitative, qualitative/discursive, and comparative/related. 
 
 Quantitative approach 
 
The politician (number of tweet) and user engagement metrics (‘likes’, retweets and comments) 
demonstrate the action of the influencer/leader and the reaction of the new audiences on 
Twitter, plotting a political and media map relating more to the Catalan independence process 
than to other issues. 
 With the aim of testing H1—the influence of political candidates on Twitter—and H2—
the extent to which the press covers the same topics—a total of 3,562 tweets posted by Spanish 
and Catalan political leaders or parties were selected, of which 526 relating to the candidates 
and the 21 D Catalan elections was analyzed. The aim was to focus on each one of the political 
leaders, given that they have a greater influence than their parties and governments [see Table 
2]. 
 
        Table 2. Candidate activity on Twitter between the 5th and 22th of December, 2017. 
   
 Puigdemont Arrimadas Rovira Iceta Albiol Domènech 
       
 
Tweets 88 66 52 174 75 71 
Mínimum 3 2 2 6 3 2 
Maximum 29 21 17 36 27 25 
Median 16,00 12,00 9,00 19,00 12,00 15,00 
Average 5,50 4,12 3,25 10,87 4,68 4,43 
 
          Limited to the first 100 cases 
       Source: own elaboration 
 
As to the tweets (88) and user engagement metrics (107,205), Carles Puigdemont (JuntsXCat) 
stood out among the rest of the candidates. Reaping the greatest number of ‘likes’, retweets, 
and comments, he was way ahead of Inés Arrimadas (C’s), the candidate who obtained the 
highest number of votes in the 21 D Catalan elections. The number of tweets (174) posted by 
the socialist candidate Mikel Iceta (PSC) is also noteworthy, although it must be taken into 
account that his tweets were not new content but mainly links to press releases, photos, videos 
and documents from a third party [Table 3]. A formula that did not have a positive effect on 
user response rates or interaction. 
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 Table 3. Number of tweets, followers and user engagement metrics (on the date of sampling) 
 
 Candidates 
Puigdemont 
JuntsXCat 
Arrimadas 
Cs 
Rovira 
ERC/CatSí 
Iceta 
PSC 
Albiol 
PP 
Domènech 
En Comú-
Podem 
Tweets 88 66 52 174 75 71 
Followers 670,056 401,319 164,232 81,210 63,160 62,345 
‘Likes’ 68,800 7,300 6,139 227 2,914 3,416 
Retweets 34,000 3,282 2,405 216 1,988 2,117 
Comments 4,317 1,549 1,235 79 2,855 1,865 
 Source: own elaboration 
 
Without downplaying the ‘likes’ or retweets, comments permit the detection of (positive and 
negative) valences that increase depending on what is involved (topic), the tools employed 
(hashtags, links, photos, videos, mentions, etc.) and how these tools are employed (language 
resources and recourse to falsehoods, persuasion or propaganda). Comments also enable 
politicians to reply, thus fostering a two-way conversation, which is supposed to be one of the 
strengths of Twitter. However, the results reveal that the interactions between the candidates 
and the public were not proportional. 
 As to the accounts of the political leaders who obtained the best results in the 21 D Catalan 
elections, namely @InesArrimadas (36 seats) and @KRLS (34 seats), the histograms 
combining variables such as the number of tweets and comments received by both candidates 
are shown below. The peaks reveal that the pro-independence leader’s tweets elicited more than 
twice the number of comments (4,317) than those of the candidate of Cs (1,549), thus 
reinforcing the assumption that Puigdemont is more influential than his greatest rival and the 
rest of the candidates [see Figure 1 & 2]. Also significant is the number of comments (2,855) 
generated by the tweets posted by García Albiol, the PP’s candidate, versus those (79) elicited 
by Iceta’s, the lowest number of all. Similarly, the number of comments (7,417) corresponding 
to the pro-independence candidates (Puigdemont, Rovira and Domènech) surpassed that 
(4,483) of their constitutionalist rivals (Arrimadas, Iceta and Albiol). In other words, the higher 
level of participation of the followers of the pro-independence bloc did not lead to a higher 
level of political interaction with users. 
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 Figure 1. Combined variables for Puigdemont’s tweets/comments 
 
 
 
 Source: IBM SPSS Statistics 24, own elaboration 
 
 
 Figure 2. Combined variables for Arrimadas’ tweets/comments 
 
 Source: IBM SPSS Statistics 24, own elaboration 
 
In short, the user engagement metrics point to a high level of response on the part of the public, 
which is not usually the case with the tweets posted by political candidates. The tweets posted 
by the pro-independence candidates received a greater number of comments, which is also 
consistent with the data available on the interactivity of these candidates, especially 
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Puigdemont and, to a lesser extent, Rovira and Domènech. All of which evinces a lower level 
of political response and confirms the traditional model of the sole discourse, also in the digital 
realm. 
 
Qualitative/Discursive approach 
 
The subject matter of the tweets, considered to be one of the study’s main variables, helps to 
identify what politicians talk about on Twitter and how they go about this, on the one hand, and 
makes it possible to verify equivalences or divergences with the topics covered in the front-
page news, on the other. 
 
 What do politicians talk about on Twitter?  
 
The variables of relationship between message subject matter (i.e. tweet content) and the role 
that it played were defined. These were then applied to the sample to answer two questions: 
what the candidates talked about on Twitter and on which topics they, the users and later, the 
media themselves, focused. 
 
Table 4. Variables of approach and topic 
 
Role Topic 
Ideology Separatism/constitutionalism 
Political agenda of the electoral campaign Campaign rallies and election results 
Electoral program Proposals, advances, developments 
Media agenda News links, videos, images 
Criticism of the central government Messages against the state, unity or the 
performance of the Spanish government 
Criticism of the opposition Messages against the ideology, program or 
statements of parties and candidates 
Interaction with users Use of the mention @ and viralization of the 
message 
Mobilising the electorate Asking for their vote, the attitude towards 
abstention 
Building the candidate’s personality Human values, private life, images of internal 
meetings and functions 
Anecdotes, curiosities, irony, humor Personal comments or those aimed at other leaders 
Miscellaneous Unclassified 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The application of the variables allowed for comparing the main topics broached in the tweets 
posted and, in turn, highlighted the issues on which each one of the candidates focused. 
 
Table 5. Aim of the tweets posted by the candidates (%) 
 
 Arrimadas Puigdemont Rovira Iceta Domènech Albiol 
Ideology 21.3 23.4 16.8 12.1 8.3 19.1 
Election 
results 
11.8 8.5 9.8 11.0 9.6 10.8 
Electoral 
programme 
10.3 4.0 10.0 4.3 8.5 11.4 
Media agenda 2.3 3.2 1.8 13.2 1.9 4.6 
Criticism of 
the central 
government 
2.8 17.2 16.9 14.0 15.5 0 
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Criticism of 
the opposition 
16.8 15.1 14.8 9.5 15.2 16.6 
Interaction 
with users 
7.3 8.3 5.8 7.6 8.1 7.3 
Mobilising 
the electorate 
13.3 14. 1 10.7 10.1 12.2 10.3 
Building the 
candidate’s 
personality 
11.3 4.5 7.8 11.1 8.9 4.5 
Anecdotes, 
curiosities, 
irony, humour 
2.3 1.3 3.8 7.0 5.6 9.4 
Miscellaneous 0.5 0.4 1.8 0.1 6.2 6.0 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The confrontation between the separatists and the constitutionalists is a frame that defined the 
21 D Catalan elections. The tweets posted by the pro-independence candidates (Puigdemont, 
Rovira and Domènech) chiefly revolved around ‘ideology,’ ‘criticism of the central 
government,’ ‘criticism of the opposition,’ and ‘mobilizing the electorate.’ For their part, the 
constitutionalist bloc candidates (Arrimadas, Iceta and Albiol), while ignoring or playing down 
the ‘criticism of the central government,’ also focused their messages on ‘ideology’ and 
‘mobilizing the electorate.’ For Puigdemont (23.4 per cent) and Arrimadas (21.3 per cent), 
‘ideology’ was the main issue on the agenda, being employed as a way of underscoring their 
stance and the division between their parties, rather than the most frequent topics, such as the 
‘electoral program’ and the ‘election results.’ It is also important to note the percentage 
difference between the candidates of the most voted parties (Cs and JuntsXCat) with respect to 
the item ‘criticism of the central government,’ specifically 16.2 per cent in the case of 
Puigdemont versus 2.8 per cent in that of Arrimadas, a contrast also observable in the rest of 
the parties, reaching 0 per cent in the case of Albiol, the representative of the central 
government in Catalonia at the time. The percentages registered as regards the supplementary 
variables such as ‘mobilizing the electorate’ and ‘interaction with users’ on Twitter show that 
there is no direct or proportional relationship between them. Although mobilizing the electorate 
is a common feature of the discourses of leaders (all of the candidates dedicated an important 
number of tweets to doing just that, but Puigdemont stood out among the rest with 14.1 per 
cent), no correlation was observed in the interaction of the candidates with their followers. By 
and large, the results confirm the candidates’ low level of interactivity on Twitter (only 
Puigdemont registered a response rate of 8.3 per cent), as opposed to the monitoring and active 
participation of the public. 
 
 How do politicians talk about on Twitter?  
 
The language of fallacy and propaganda is a strategy that defines the discourse of political 
leaders. These are mechanisms of influence that can sway the response of users and mark 
differences in the communication model of the candidates.  
 
Table 6.  Propaganda mechanisms on the political discourse (%)  
 
 Puigdemont Arrimadas Rovira Iceta Albiol Domènech Puigdemont Arrimadas 
Use of 
Labels 
20.2   6.5   0 23.4   0.3 18.3 20.2   6.5 
Fallacy 29.8 22.1   6.3 19.6 25.7 17.4 29.8 22.1 
Stereotypes   0   0.7   3.2   1.2 27.2   0.9   0   0.7 
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Biased 
Attributions 
14.0 26.4 18.4   5.7 21.4 29.2 14.0 26.4 
Speaking 
from other 
sources 
  3.1   3.5 25.3 28.1   3.1 25.7   3.1   3.5 
Selection of 
information 
  5.6 16.3 27.9 3.2   5.2    4.2   5.6 16.3 
Opinions as 
facts 
25.7 23.7 16.6 16.1 16.5   2.1 25.7 23.7 
Others   1.3   0.6   2.2   2.4   0.4   2.2   1.3   0.6 
 
The percentages in bold correspond to the resources most used by each candidate 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The results confirm widespread use of these mechanisms by leaders. However, Puigdemont's 
role as a strategist is highlighted. The pro-independence leader especially uses fallacy (29.8), 
opinions as facts (25.7) and labels (20.2), which criticize the actions of the central government 
(f.e.see Image 1). To emphasize the message, he also uses hashtags, mentions, and links to 
information published in the media.  As for her part, Inés Arrimadas stands out for the use of 
biased attributions (26.4) and opinions as facts (23.7), appealing for compliance with the law 
on the part of the pro-independence supporters (f.e.see Image 2). 
 
  Image 1. Fallacy and Opinions as facts             Image 2.  Fallacy and Biased Attributions 
 
Source: Twitter 
 
 
 
Source: Twitter 
 
Other politicians such as Albiol (PP) reach benchmark percentages in the use of stereotypes 
(27.2), focused on the campaign slogan: “Spain is the solution.” In addition, it frequently resorts 
to the issue of the exit of companies from Catalonia as a negative consequence of the conflict 
(see f.e. Image 3). In the case of Marta Rovira (ERC), the selection of information (27.9) and 
the use of other sources (25.3) stands out and focuses on the issue of imprisoned Catalan 
politicians. (see f.e. Image 4). 
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Image 3. Fallacy and Stereotypes                                       Image 4. Selection of information 
 
 
Source: Twitter 
 
 
 
     Source: Twitter 
 
A characteristic of Iceta (PSC) is the use of non-own tweets that include references to other 
sources (28.1), through links connected to the media (Image 5). Finally, Domènech (Comú-
Podems) is characterized by the use of biased attributions (29.2) referring, above all, to the role 
of Citizens in the Catalan conflict (see Image 6). 
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Image 5. Speaking from other sources                                  Image 6. Biased Attributions and Fallacy  
 
  
 
Source: Twitter                                                                                                    Source: Twitter 
 
  
 How does the political message on Twitter influence the media? 
 
The analysis performed on the national and regional newspapers selected for the study (ABC, 
El País, La Vanguardia and El Periódico de Cataluña) revealed that of the total number of 
tweets posted (526) – mostly by Puigdemont (38.6 per cent), Arrimadas (31.8 per cent) and, to 
a lesser extent, the rest of the candidates (29.5 per cent) – the content of 44 was then published 
on their front pages. 
 The specific issues relating to the general topic that received that greatest amount of front-
page coverage in the press included the ‘application of Article 155’ (27.63 per cent), 
‘Puigdemont’s flight’ (24.43 per cent), ‘imprisoned politicians’ (21.31 per cent), and the 
‘exodus of companies from Catalonia’ (9.51 per cent). 
 
Table 7.  Main topics on front-page (%) 
 
Topic ABC El País La Vanguardia El Periódico de 
Cataluña 
Total 
Article 155 7.4 6.1 6.2 7.9  27.6 
Puigdemont’s 
flight 
7.9 7.1 7.2 2.2 24.4 
Imprisoned 
politicians 
3.2 5.7 5.3 7.1 21.3 
Legal action 2.5 4.3 4.1 7.2 17.1 
Exodus of 
companies from 
Catalonia 
3.3 2.9 2.7 0.6 9.5 
 
The percentages in bold correspond to the topics most used by each newspaper. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Pérez Curiel, C.                                                                                                        00 
 
The contingency between the variables (press/topic/candidate) reflects the relevance of the 
Article 155 issue in both newspapers, with Puigdemont (JuntsXCat) and Arrimadas (Cs) 
sharing first place. The central government’s decision to apply this article led to other conflicts 
such as ‘Puigdemont’s flight’ and the ‘exodus of companies from Catalonia,’ issues covered 
on the front page of ABC, and ‘imprisoned politicians’ and ‘legal action,’ front-page news in 
El Periódico de Cataluña. The rest of the Spanish (El País) and Catalan (La Vanguardia) press 
registered percentages more similar to the ‘relationship with current affairs’ variable, regardless 
of whether or not the news was related to the elections. Along these lines, the issue “Huida de 
Puigdemont” is highlighted on the front page with a significant percentage in both media 
(7.1/7.2). The application of 155 generated consequences linked to the electoral advance, the 
dismissal of the government of Catalonia, the imprisonment of its political representatives and 
the flight of Puiddemont, President of the Generalitat. All these issues occupy a protagonist 
space on Twitter and as a result on the front pages of the press. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The last elections in Catalonia (21D) were held in a context of confrontation and conflict 
between the political institutions of the state (the central government) and those of Catalonia 
(the Generalitat), between the pro-independence and constitutionalist parties, between the 
citizenry and also between the media themselves. The developments prior to the Catalan 
independence process (the referendum, the unilateral declaration of independence, the 
application of Article 155, the dissolution of the Catalan parliament and the election call) 
differed from the previous elections. In this respect, the results of this study point to the 
different stances taken by the candidates on Twitter, the unidirectional nature of their messages, 
propaganda discourse, the citizenry’s level of response, and the transfer and polarization of the 
political and media agendas. 
 In view of the relationship observed between the tweets posted by the candidates (not their 
parties) on their personal accounts, those that engaged users most and the issues making it to 
the front pages of the press, H1 has been confirmed. 
 The conclusions linked to this hypothesis corroborate that Twitter is a platform with 
resources that promote information sharing, interaction, and mobilization (Gainous and 
Wagner, 2014; Jackson and Lilleker, 2011; Stromer-Galley, 2014). The messages most 
commented by users correspond to the leaders who enhance a discourse based on fallacy and 
propaganda. In this line, most candidates use resources (hashtags, mentions, links) to further 
emphasize the message. Puigdemont performance on Twitter, which attracted the attention of 
his fan community and multiplied the number of comments in favor of independence, stood out 
among the rest. However, in none of the cases analyzed here was the response of the candidates 
proportional to the active participation of the public. The unidirectional nature of the messages 
and the lack of interaction defined the political communication model. 
 As to the transfer of agendas (Aruguete, 2017; Casero-Ripollés, 2015; Chadwick, 2013), 
there was a three-point correlation: the topics that the candidates broached most 
(separatism/constitutionalism, criticism/support of the Spanish and Catalan governments and 
mobilizing the electorate) were, in turn, those that then went viral on the internet and made it 
to the front pages of the press. The latter focused more on very specific issues (the application 
of Article 155, Puigdemont’s flight, imprisoned politicians, legal action, and the exodus of 
companies from Catalonia) than on topics inherent to any electoral process (the electoral 
program, the election results, or the political agenda). 
H2 was also borne out. The independence process was one of the main frames of the messages 
of the candidates and Twitter users, on the one hand, and the news published in the press, on 
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the other. This main frame was characterized by the polarization inherent to political leaders 
and the news treatment of the media. 
 The conclusions relating to this hypothesis states that topics addressed most by the 
candidates, followed most by users and covered most in the press referred to the conflict arising 
from the independence process. Moreover, the mobilization of the electorate on social media 
(Balcells and Padró-Solanet, 2016) was a common aim of all of the candidates, although it was 
the pro-independence leaders, with Puigdemont at the forefront, who managed to influence and 
attract a greater number of followers. 
 The most viral messages were posted by the pro-independence candidates, who 
incorporated the idea of separating from Spain and the conflict provoked by the central 
government (the application of Article 155, the imprisonment of a number pro-independence 
politicians, Puigdemont’s flights, and the legal action taken). The political leaders analyzed 
here encouraged the public to take an active stance on the matter (Montoya and Vandehey, 
2009; Pérez-Ortega, 2014; Rampersad, 2009), reflected in the user engagement metrics and 
especially in the comments posted on Twitter. The Catalan elections on 21 December 2017 and 
the issues relating to this type of process lost ground to the independence process as a frame of 
the political and media agenda. 
 Our findings underscore that the role of politicians on Twitter during electoral campaigns 
depends on many factors pertaining to the political and social context and the extent to which 
the influence of the subject (leader) over the object (topic) is decisive in attracting voters and 
setting agendas. 
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